

Sympathy or Tolerance? A Comparison of the Effects of Trusting Most People and Trusting Strangers in Asian Societies

The Senshu Social Well-being Review
2018, No. 5, 21-36
© Senshu University 2018
<http://ir.acc.senshu-u.ac.jp>

Keitaro Yazaki^a

Abstract

The social sciences have increasingly focused on generalized social trust—namely, trust in most people—as a key value for civil society. However, if all values have boundaries and are simultaneously inclusive and exclusive, is generalized social trust inclusive of all people? Are social minorities such as strangers overlooked? Sociological research on strangers defines trust in strangers as civil inattention or indifference to others—a momentary attitude of tolerance toward unknown others while being detached from them. We distinguish trust in strangers from the concept of generalized trust by focusing on collective behavior denoting sympathy for unknown others, as measured by trust in most people. This study compares trust in most people and trust in strangers as a measure of generalized trust, and examines whether both types of trust can be qualitatively distinguished by using data from the International Comparative Surveys on Lifestyle and Values (ICSLV) for seven Asian societies. Using OLS regression, this study compares the effect of two kinds of trust on individual well-being and consensus building. In general, the results suggest that trusting strangers does not affect well-being and consensus building. These results indicate that trust in most people is sufficient while trust in strangers is meaningless.

Keywords

well-being, generalized trust, trust in most people, sociology of strangers

Classical sociologists argued that modern society developed through the acceptance of strangers as they bring various external resources into the community and make social order in the local community more flexible and fluid (Simmel 1908; Sombart 1991 [1928]; Tönnies 2005 [1887]). Today, the presence of strangers is expanding more radically than they had assumed: while they regarded strangers only in the framework of nation state, society itself has become more multicultural and, already, does not correspond to the idea of a nation (Radtke 1998:81–2). Under globalization, many

people are crossing borders more easily and experience themselves as strangers in some way. Another point that classical sociologists could not explain is xenophobia (Greek for “fear for strangers”) in societies where the existence of strangers is more generalized (Hahn 1994; Nassehi 1995; Bauman 1998; Stichweh 2007). This prompts the question:

^a Senshu University

Corresponding Author:

Keitaro Yazaki, Senshu University, 2-1-1, Higashi-mita, Tama-ku, Kawasaki-shi, Kanagawa-ken 214-8580, Japan.
Email: kei.yzk.15@gmail.com

why does this contradictory situation of simultaneously accepting and rejecting the stranger occur in modern society? The purpose of this paper is to consider the relation between society and strangers.

Numerous studies on social trust use a concept of strangers based on a different perspective—understanding them through a measure of generalized trust, which is often defined as having a wider radius of trust in others. Understood as a feeling that most people—or unknown strangers—can be trusted, generalized social trust makes and develops civil society, enhances democratic stability (Putnam 1993), reduces economic inequality (Rose 2014), promotes individual well-being (Helliwell 2002), and is important for both individual and social well-being.

However, this perspective does not sufficiently explain the relation with strangers when immigrants are regarded as strangers. Some studies have revealed the negative relation between diversity, generalized trust, and well-being: ethnic diversity decreases not only social capital in the short-term (Putnam 2007) or generalized trust (Dinesen and Sønderskov 2015), but also individual well-being (Longhi 2014). These findings suggest that generalized trust is not well oriented to the acceptance of diversity.

Does this type of problem arise from a lack of measurement validity in trusting most people? In most cases, the concept of generalized trust is measured as trust in most people. However, some scholars have noted that this indicator includes both trust in unknown people (those outside interpersonal relationships) and well-known people at the same time (Sturgis and Smith 2010). Delhey, Newton, and Welzel (2011), for instance, have shown that the trust radius of Confucian societies is narrower than that of Western societies. What “most people” means depends on culture or region. Even though this concept indicates a wider range of people in Western than in Confucian societies, it is obvious that this concept does not include “all people.” We assumed that “few people,” social minorities, or strangers are overlooked when considering “most people.”

Our interest lies in how we can understand such types of people in the view of major quantitative surveys. As another way to avoid the ambiguity of the trust radius, Naef and Schupp (2009) suggest using the idea of trust in strangers instead of trust in most people. If we use a more accurate measurement, will this problem be resolved?

We regarded trust in strangers as having a qualitatively different function than trust in most people, and thus these concepts can never be reduced to the same category. In exploring this question, we expected there to be a qualitative difference between these concepts. The work of Georg Simmel (1908) and Alfred Schütz (2002) reflect the premise that trust in strangers defines “strangers” differently than the concept of generalized trust. In their frameworks, a stranger is one who cannot sympathize with the society or other groups. As Hellmann (1998) formulated this, strangers are constructed when a lack of understanding or distrust occurs in communication. Conversely, strangers will not be strangers when they are trusted or understood. Therefore, trusting strangers is paradoxical because it involves trusting persons or things that are untrustworthy, whose inconsistency is resolved when one ceases to judge whether the other can be trusted. This kind of trust is oriented not to mutual understanding, *sympathy*, or “shared values” (Fukuyama 1995), which are expected to be fostered by trust in most people, but to temporary *tolerance* that instead requires distance from the generalized value. By integrating trust in most people and trust in strangers into one category, the complicated relationships of strangers with society disappears from view. As such, the social acceptance of strangers can never be resolved by simply affirming and promoting the generalized value of social trust.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The theory of social capital stems from Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy. Based on the notion of sympathy as a basic human need, the theory of social capital links the

consumption of one person to that of others without calculating the return (Robison, Schmid, and Siles 2002). In addition to being adopted for well-known people—such as family, relatives, friends, and neighbors—this concept has been extended to a wider range of people, such as strangers beyond one's interpersonal networks and unknown people (Stolle 2002). As such, generalized trust expands the radius of sympathy. The starting point of this paper is that the theory of generalized trust and social capital too easily assumes the possibility of mutual understanding with a wide variety of people.

Georg Simmel (1903) criticized Smith's concept of sympathy, claiming that it was only valid for small communities—such as the *polis* in ancient Greece—in which people are fairly homogeneous, and their interests relatively simple and undifferentiated. Modern society is characterized by urbanization, social differentiation, and increasing diversity thus rendering sympathy largely impossible.

Simmel cast similar doubts on the view of strangers. Globalization promotes encounters with strangers, accepting them not as an outsiders who “come today and leave tomorrow” but as new members who “come today and stay tomorrow.” However, strangeness—or being an “outsider”—never disappears in society because a society physically close to strangers is mentally distanced from them (Simmel 1908). Schütz (2002) emphasized the isolation of strangers more intensively. He referred to the theory of the looking-glass self, indicating that a group or a person who observes others only understands them through his own frame of interpretation and thus never understands strangers. Bauman (1998) regarded strangers as located in the uncertainty between friendship and enmity. For Bauman, the category of strangers is both constructed—as strangers are neither near nor far—and ambivalent. If a group has understood a stranger, then the stranger is not strange. Strangers are strange—that is, they are an unknown—because the group does not understand them.

In every respect, these sociologists sought to decipher how people develop mutual understanding with strangers and pointed out the fundamental difficulty of doing so. Taking these views into account, how can we regard trust in strangers regardless of sympathy? Stichweh stressed the “paradoxical structure” of trusting strangers. In modern society, where various strangers live together, a new social framework has been generated: minimal sympathy with indifference toward others or civil inattention, which Goffman described as a form of trusting strangers (Stichweh 2007:4–7). While people in urban cities must detach themselves from others in order to be indifferent, they must also make some gesture to show minimum attention such as through eye contact (Goffman 1963:84).

This study defines “strangers” as constructed, when non-understanding occurs in some communication process, or when this non-understanding is structured as distrust (Hellmann 1998: 434). So, we cannot specify a priori who strangers are: “strangers” does not have an objective character, but is a relational concept (Hahn 1994). It is dependent on the context of a group or society. People who once had the same religion may be divided by dogma and come to be stigmatized as “heretics” to each other as a result of some political change. People who had the same racial, linguistic, and cultural origins may become strangers in other contexts, especially in the street or public spaces. This constructed character of strangers is exactly the same as the concept of ethnicity, which is constructed in relation with other groups (Banton 2008:1275–6). In this sense, the concept of strangers is neither an objective category nor one constructed by individual subjective feelings. It is specified reactively by intersubjective contexts in each society or culture when some lack of understanding or distrust occurs in communication or interactions.

When we regard the construction of strangers as a result of distrust, trusting strangers becomes paradoxical as Stichweh stressed (2007) because it denotes trust in something distrusted. To avoid or resolve

this contradiction, some social techniques exist: people can trust and distrust strangers at the same time, trust them as neighbors but distrust them as citizens, or can stop doubting them temporally and trust them successively (Hellmann 1998:439). In any case—reserving judgement whether a person is trustworthy or not, strangers are trusted by suspending the possibility of sympathy and mutual understanding.

In this framework, we can distinguish between trust in most people and trust in strangers. The former is oriented to sympathy, while the latter is possible by suspending sympathy in a momentary attitude of tolerance toward an unknown other. This does not prevent the creation of sympathy, but demonstrates a social technique of treating people in ways that do not involve checking whether they can agree with one another. This kind of trust can be distinguished from generalized trust or trust in most people by the following two points.

First, trusting strangers does not contribute to social well-being and the building of social consensus. The paradoxical and ambivalent characteristics, which create both closeness to unknown others and distance from others, do not stabilize the consensus building expected by the theories of generalized trust or social capital. In our framework, “bowling alone” (Putnam 2001) is not only caused by declining social trust, which facilitates collective activity for common purposes, but may also result from having high trust in strangers and the internalization of gestures of civil indifference. Thus, trusting strangers never contributes to sympathy and is unrelated to social well-being.

Second, trusting strangers does not enhance individual well-being directly. While sympathy as a basic human need raises well-being, temporary tolerance, or suspending sympathy or trust itself, has no impact on happiness. Civil inattention as one social technique can extend a radius of trust; it also prompts loneliness (Bauman and May 2001:40) because such behavior always remains at the surface and never engenders

a heart-to-heart conversation. However, we do not conclude that trust in strangers has no effect on individual well-being at any time. It is determined by social conditions. Simmel’s definition mentioned previously suggests the paradoxical relation with strangers: in modern society, strangers are physically accepted as residents or citizens, but mentally isolated. Urban society makes people more or less strangers, especially in public space. The presence of strangers has so disappeared, that people are needed only to *get along with* strangers and lose interest in them mentally. If we apply this relationship to rural society, the exact opposite can be deduced: strangers are physically excluded, but can be mentally accepted. In such society, the utility of strangers is increased, if they are constructed as investors or tourists, who make a profit directly for indigenous people, even though the mean level of trust in strangers is particularly low.

HYPOTHESES

Based on the aforementioned theories of strangers, we assumed that trust in most people is qualitatively different from trust in strangers. To examine this idea, this study comprises three hypotheses.

First, we hypothesize that three kinds of trust exist: trust in family, trust in strangers, and trust in most people. Moreover, trust in most people serves to bridge the other two types of trust. We examine this using the partial correlation between these types of trust (see Figure 1). They are different in terms of the radius of trust: trust in family is based on sympathy and reserved for well-known people like family, relatives, friends, and neighbors. Trust in most people also fosters sympathy, but expands its circle to unknown others. Both are positively correlated in regard to sympathy. Trust in most people is positively associated with trust in strangers because both are directed to unknown people, although both functions are qualitatively different in that they are oriented toward sympathy or tolerance that suspends the possibility of sympathy with

surface acceptance. Trust in family has a negative correlation with trust in strangers because both are totally different in terms of the trust radius and the quality of trust, which results in conflict between them.

Generalized social trust or trust in most people measures sympathy for unknown people while trust in strangers suspends the possibility of sympathy and enhances the perceptual and temporary tolerance for unknown people. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that accepting strangers brings benefits with regard to either individual or social well-being, such as consensus building.

Second, we hypothesize that trust in strangers functions differently to trust in most people. In examining this hypothesis, we tested the hypothesis that trusting strangers fosters no consensus building, while trusting most people affects it positively (see Figure

2).

Finally, we hypothesize that trust in strangers has no effect on individual well-being (see Figure 3). However, considering the paradoxical relation with strangers, the effect depends on a social condition, namely, the degree of modernization. While strangers are physically accepted in modern society, they remain mentally isolated. In contrast, while strangers in rural society are physically distanced, they can be accepted mentally because traditional society did not reject all strangers, who were welcomed when their stay was temporary and brought some benefit, such as a tourist or guest (Stichweh 2009).

This study compared the effects of two types of generalized trust—trust in most people and trust in strangers—on consensus building and individual well-being by using data from the *International Comparative*




Figure 1. Hypothesis 1




Figure 2. Hypothesis 2




Figure 3. Hypothesis 3

Surveys on Lifestyle and Values (ICSLV). This survey offers representative data from seven Asian countries, as shown in Table 1.

As the key independent variables, we measured trust in most people and trust in strangers through the following statements: “To what degree do you feel you can trust or not trust the following people?” for most people and strangers. Using a five-point scale, the possible answers ranged from “Can trust a lot” (5), “Can trust” (4), “Can trust somewhat” (3), “Can hardly trust” (2), or “Cannot trust at all” (1). This item did not ask who most people or strangers are but measured the cognitive or subjective extent of trust.

Table 2 shows the proportion of respondents whose trust score was 3 or higher. The proportion of both trust in most people and trust in strangers was relatively low in Thailand and Vietnam but was higher in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

We used this data to test our three hypotheses, employing Spearman’s partial correlation to test the first hypothesis, OLS regression analysis to test the second hypothesis, and both the Cantril ladder method and OLS regression to test the third hypothesis.

Before examining Spearman’s partial correlation between the kinds of trust (family, most people, strangers) posited by our first hypothesis, we needed to consider the results of each mean value (see Appendix Table A1). Each of the seven Asian societies surveyed (Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, and Vietnam) showed a similar structure: the family was trusted most, while strangers were trusted the least. There was also a clear difference between East and Southeast Asian societies: trust in family tended to be lower in East Asian societies, while trust in strangers was lower in Southeast Asian societies.

To assess the second hypothesis, we used OLS regression to compare the effects of two types of generalized trust on problem-solving abilities in a community as a measure of consensus building. This independent variable was measured using the following statement: “Do you think that your neighbors can solve their disputes (trash disposal, noise, sunlight blockage, etc.) internally within the community?” The respondents’ answers were scored on a 5-point scale: “Definitely” (5), “Probably” (4), “Maybe” (3), “Probably not” (2), or “Definitely not” (1). This item did not ask about an objective ability in problem-solving, but only a subjective or cognitive

Table 1. Survey Data Study Description

	JP	KR	TW	VN	PH	IN	TH
Date	2015	2015	2017	2015	2016	2017	2016
Age	20-70	20-69	20-69	18-74	18-80	20-82	17-90
Methods	Web survey	Web survey, partly telephonic survey	Web survey	Face-to-face interview	Face-to-face interview	Face-to-face interview	Face-to-face interview
N	11,804	2,000	2,303	1,202	1,200	1,250	1,126

Note. JP stands for Japan, KR for South Korea, TW for Taiwan, PH for the Philippines, IN for Indonesia, VN for Vietnam, and TH for Thailand.

Table 2. Proportion of Trust in Most People and Trust in Strangers (Unit: %)

	JP	KR	TW	VN	PH	IN	TH
Trust in Most People	69.1	70.3	84.0	60.0	72.7	75.5	48.1
Trust in Strangers	35.1	20.3	41.2	15.5	27.6	22.1	10.0

Note. This table shows the proportion of respondents whose trust score was 3 or higher (“Can trust somewhat,” “Can trust,” “Can trust a lot”).

expectation of it. We assumed that this item was also highly correlated to projections for social consensus building. The mean values of this variable were lower in East Asia and higher in Southeast Asia. This model was controlled for social attributes (including gender, education, income, marital status, age, and employment status) and trust in various types or groups of people (family, neighbors, and governmental staff) because these types of trust are partially correlated with one another and affect the independent variable. Although trust in neighbors was positively correlated with trust in most people, these two variables must be distinguished theoretically, as the neighborhood is constructed through a wider relationship than that of the family but does not consist of unknown people. Moreover, trust in strangers had a positive correlation with trust in government staff, and this also requires theoretical differentiation: the government is a social system operated by unknown people, gives more explicit priority to abstract principles like the law (Giddens 1990), and uses the medium of symbolic generalized communication (Luhmann 1973).

Lastly, we examined the kind of generalized trust that affects well-being. As a dependent variable of general life satisfaction (Helliwell, Huang, and Wang 2016:13–4), we used the Cantril ladder on an 11-point scale with the following statement:

Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. Suppose we say that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you, and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for

you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time, assuming that the higher the step, the better you feel about your life, and the lower the step, the worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest to the way you feel?

This item measured general well-being, which assesses one’s whole life from a more reflective perspective than happiness. This abstract well-being is highly associated with generalized trust, which measures more abstract relationships with others. The mean values in East Asia were lower than those of Southeast Asia. The controlled variables we used were the same as those in the second hypothesis.

RESULTS

The results of the Spearman’s partial correlation analysis mostly supported our first hypothesis that trust in most people has a bridging function between family and strangers (see Table 3). Trust in most people was positively correlated with trust in strangers in each of the seven societies at a statistically significant level; it was also positively correlated with trust in family in all societies except Thailand. The correlation between trust in strangers and trust in family was significantly negative in all seven countries except the Philippines. Thailand was a special case wherein a good relationship with the family conflicted with relationships with unknown people—not only in the case of strangers, but most people.

We used OLS regression to determine the effect of trust in most people and in

Table 3. Partial Correlation between Kinds of Trust

	JP	KR	TW	VN	PH	IN	TH
Trust in Most People & Trust in Strangers	.35***	.28***	.23***	.30***	.20***	.21***	.18***
Trust in Most People & Trust in Family	.09***	.18***	.33***	.17***	.20***	.06*	-.08**
Trust in Strangers & Trust in Family	-.17***	-.12***	-.12***	-.21***	-.04	-.07*	-.08*

Note: See Appendix Table A2 for details.

strangers on consensus building, the results of which are provided in Table 4. These results supported our second hypothesis: trust in strangers does not contribute to consensus building. Indeed, trust in strangers had no influence on problem-solving abilities in any of the seven societies. Moreover, in the case of Vietnam and the Philippines, trust in strangers negatively affected consensus building in the community at a statistically significant level. This result suggests that trusting strangers only enhances the acceptance of unknown others in face-to-face relationships, but does not contribute to consensus building in the community. In Vietnam and the Philippines, tolerant behavior—which Goffman conceptualized as civil inattention—even makes it difficult to solve problems in the community.

In contrast to trust in strangers, trust in most people positively affected problem-solving abilities in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. However, we could not find any statistically significant effect in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. This

result indicates that the communities in these three countries consist of well-known people who interact with one another on a daily basis and share the same values; consequently, both sympathy for unknown others and the acceptance of strangers are of little use for creating consensus in the community. Vietnam showed different results from other societies: trust in most people enhanced problem-solving ability on the one hand while trust in strangers interfered with collective decision-making. This result suggested that the shared value fostered by trusting most people can build upon the sacrifice of a few people, colored by some form of nationalistic value or political ideology.

In testing the third hypothesis, OLS regression was conducted to predict individual well-being with regard to both trust in most people and trust in strangers. Table 5 shows the effects of both types of trust (results of the other controlled variables are provided in Appendix Table A2).

The results support the third hypothesis: in modern society, trust in strangers has no

Table 4. Regression of the Dependent Variable of Problem-solving Ability in the Community

	JP	KR	TW	VN	PH	IN	TH
	B (β)	B (β)	B (β)	B (β)	B (β)	B (β)	B (β)
	1.56 (.00) ***	2.04 (.00) ***	1.39 (.00) ***	1.74 (.00) ***	2.70 (.00) ***	3.27 (.00) ***	2.30 (.00) ***
Female (Dummy)	-.07 (-.04) ***	-.06 (-.04)	.06 (.03)	.05 (.02)	.09 (.04)	-.06 (-.03)	-.07 (-.03)
Married (Dummy)	.00 (.00)	-.03 (-.02)	.03 (.01)	-.01 (.00)	-.12 (-.05)	-.06 (-.03)	.05 (.03)
Age	.00 (.05) ***	.00 (.05) *	.00 (-.02)	.00 (.05)	.00 (-.02)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.06)
Temporary worker (dummy)	-.01 (.00)	-.06 (-.02)	.06 (.01)	-.03 (-.01)	-.38 (-.13) **	-.09 (-.04)	-.15 (-.05)
Self-employed (dummy)	.06 (.02)	-.06 (-.03)	.15 (.05) *	-.09 (-.04)	-.17 (-.07)	-.04 (-.02)	.03 (.01)
Unemployed (Dummy)	-.22 (-.04) ***	.00 (.00)	.03 (.01)	-.12 (-.02)	-.28 (-.07)	-.23 (-.04)	-.23 (-.03)
Non-employed (Dummy)	-.02 (-.01)	.06 (.03)	.01 (.00)	.12 (.03)	-.23 (-.09)	-.04 (-.02)	.04 (.02)
University or Higher Degree (Dummy)	-.02 (-.01)	-.06 (-.04)	-.07 (-.03)	-.13 (-.05)	.22 (.06) *	.06 (.02)	-.11 (-.04)
Household Income (thousand USD)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.03)	.00 (.04)	.04 (.14) ***	-.01 (-.03)	-.01 (-.07) *	.00 (-.02)
Trust in family (1-5)	.03 (.03) **	.04 (.04)	.03 (.03)	.08 (.05)	.04 (.03)	.06 (.04)	.07 (.05)
Trust in neighbors (1-5)	.22 (.21) ***	.13 (.13) ***	.31 (.22) ***	.23 (.17) ***	.30 (.23) ***	.14 (.12) ***	.18 (.16) ***
Trust in government staff (1-5)	.05 (.05) ***	.03 (.04)	.07 (.06) *	.08 (.07) *	.02 (.01)	.03 (.04)	.06 (.06)
Trust in most people (1-5)	.05 (.05) ***	.08 (.07) *	.13 (.09) ***	.17 (.15) ***	.03 (.02)	.06 (.05)	-.03 (-.03)
Trust in strangers (1-5)	.02 (.02)	.02 (.03)	.03 (.02)	-.11 (-.08) **	-.08 (-.06) *	-.01 (-.01)	-.11 (-.07) *
N	10,434	1,970	2,299	1,092	1,100	1,085	1,093
Adjusted R ²	.10	.06	.11	.10	.07	.03	.05

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. All VIF are less than 2.

effect on individual well-being, while trust in most people has a positive effect. The effects of both types of trust varied from society to society. In Japan, both types of trust showed a positive effect on well-being at a statistically significant level. However, when comparing the results, trust in most people (.06) had a greater effect on well-being than trust in strangers (.03). The results for Korea and Taiwan fully supported our hypothesis that only trust in most people has an influence on individual well-being. We did not identify a statistically significant effect in the Philippines and Indonesia. Moreover, in Vietnam and Thailand, the results showed a conflicting effect: trust in strangers enhanced well-being while trust in most people reduced well-being. We suggest that this result is

produced by the similar social structures found in Vietnam and Thailand, which are characterized by a large number of rural residents: 74% of respondents in Vietnam were rural residents, as were 66% of those in Thailand (see Table 6).

These results are consistent with Simmel's view of the paradoxical relationship with strangers: a society physically close to strangers is mentally distanced from them. If this view is valid in modern society, in rural society the opposite applies as a rural society that is physically distanced from strangers can be mentally close to them. Although the existence of a stranger is unusual in such a society, the profits provided by tourists and investors are also more obvious than in urbanized society.

Table 5. Regression of the Dependent Variable of Individual Well-being (Cantril Ladder)

	JP	KR	TW	VN	PH	IN	TH
	B (β)	B (β)	B (β)	B (β)	B (β)	B (β)	B (β)
	1.30 (.00) ***	.56 (.00) *	.87 (.00) **	6.08 (.00) ***	4.82 (.00) ***	4.13 (.00) ***	5.52 (.00) ***
Female (Dummy)	.50 (.13) ***	.28 (.07) **	.19 (.05) **	.02 (.01)	.33 (.09) **	.21 (.07) *	.22 (.07) *
Married (Dummy)	.73 (.17) ***	.52 (.12) ***	.31 (.09) ***	.14 (.04)	-.05 (-.01)	.34 (.10) **	.05 (.01)
Age	.00 (.00)	.00 (-.02)	.01 (.04)	-.01 (-.12) ***	.00 (.03)	-.01 (-.10) **	.00 (-.03)
Temporary worker (dummy)	-.20 (-.04) ***	-.44 (-.07) **	-.19 (-.03)	-.21 (-.06)	-.33 (-.07)	-.37 (-.10) *	-.46 (-.10) *
Self-employed (dummy)	.08 (.01)	-.23 (-.04)	-.01 (.00)	-.16 (-.05)	-.40 (-.10) *	.00 (.00)	-.01 (.00)
Unemployed (Dummy)	-.96 (-.07) ***	-1.07 (-.12) ***	-.76 (-.09) ***	-1.06 (-.12) ***	-.29 (-.05)	-.05 (-.01)	-1.09 (-.08) **
Non-employed (Dummy)	.14 (.03) **	-.18 (-.03)	.05 (.01)	.00 (.00)	-.40 (-.10) *	.09 (.03)	-.33 (-.08)
University or Higher Degree (Dummy)	.13 (.03) ***	.15 (.04)	.27 (.07) ***	.13 (.04)	.20 (.03)	.46 (.11) ***	.32 (.08) *
Household Income (thousand USD)	.01 (.13) ***	.02 (.18) ***	.00 (.10) ***	.02 (.04)	.04 (.15) ***	.01 (.08) *	.01 (.08) *
Trust in family (1-5)	.45 (.20) ***	.30 (.12) ***	.28 (.13) ***	.14 (.05)	.30 (.14) ***	.52 (.19) ***	.26 (.13) ***
Trust in neighbors (1-5)	.12 (.05) ***	.18 (.07) *	.16 (.07) **	.17 (.09) **	-.11 (-.05)	.06 (.03)	.10 (.06)
Trust in government staff (1-5)	.21 (.09) ***	.30 (.12) ***	.17 (.08) ***	.12 (.07) *	.04 (.02)	.07 (.04)	.05 (.03)
Trust in most people (1-5)	.16 (.06) ***	.48 (.16) ***	.48 (.19) ***	-.16 (-.09) **	.05 (.02)	-.03 (-.02)	-.12 (-.08) *
Trust in strangers (1-5)	.07 (.03) **	.02 (.01)	.10 (.04)	.16 (.08) *	.11 (.05)	.01 (.00)	.21 (.09) **
N	10,434	1,970	2,299	1,092	1,100	1,085	1,093
Adjusted R ²	.10	.06	.11	.10	.07	.03	.05

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. All VIF are less than 2.

Table 6. Proportion of Residents in Rural Areas (Unit: %)

	JP	KR	TW	VN	PH	IN	TH
Results of ICSLV	91.7	92.4	N.A.	25.8	78.6	65.0	34.5
UN Statics	91.4	81.6	76.9	33.8	46.3	53.3	47.7

Note. Data for UN statics are retrieved from the United Nations Population Division's World Urbanization Prospects: 2014 Revision.

DISCUSSION

The results of this analysis indicated that in urbanized societies, only trust in most people enhanced individual and social well-being although respondents were incapable of trusting strangers. When we focus only on the effect of trust in most people, this surely has a positive meaning for individuals and the whole society, but if we consider the different function achieved between trusting most people and trusting strangers, the results do not show an optimistic outcome for strangers as these societies do not accept strangers cognitively in the sense of experiencing well-being.

Based on these results, we can assess the stages of modernization in each society. The evaluation criterion is not economic development as measured by GDP, but the extent of accepting diversity. The objective indicator to measure modernization is *urbanization*. In non-urbanized cities, there are very few opportunities to have contact with people that have different values and are perceived to be strangers. Urban areas function as a *medium for the physical acceptance of strangers*. However, urbanization does not always create interactions between different people as people can refuse communication with untrusted strangers. Trust in strangers facilitates *the surface acceptance of strangers*, and suspends judgment on whether

they are trustworthy or not, mostly through conveying a gesture of tolerance, such as eye contact or exchanging a bow. Although this form of interaction promotes communication among people who do not understand or who distrust each other, it does not always develop into subjective acceptance. Someone who temporarily trusted a stranger can feel distrusted by them, after having conveyed a tolerant attitude. *Subjective acceptance of strangers* is possible when a person evaluates positively communication with strangers whom he or she cannot understand or trust. Even if a society shows a higher level of trust in strangers, it can evoke xenophobia at some point.

Based on this framework, we assess the modernization stages of each society in Table 7. Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea are highly urbanized and shows relatively higher trust in strangers. However, trust has no relationship with individual well-being in these societies. Therefore, we evaluate these societies as not developed, but developing, even though the extent of modernization is relatively higher than the other four societies. Only Japan showed a positive relationship between individual well-being and trust in strangers at a statistically significant level, but we refrain from making that judgement, given the huge sample size and relatively lower coefficient. The result for South Korea indicates a lower level of trust in strangers than would be supposed from its high degree

Table 7. The modernization stages of each society

Country	Urbanization	Level of trust in strangers	Trust in strangers and individual well-being	Trust in most people and individual well-being
Japan	Higher (91.4%)	Higher (35.1%)	None (positive)	Positive
Taiwan	Higher (76.9%)	Higher (41.2%)	None	Positive
South Korea	Higher (81.6%)	Middle (20.3%)	None	Positive
Indonesia	Middle (53.3%)	Middle (22.1%)	None	None
The Philippines	Middle (46.3%)	Middle (27.6%)	None	None
Thailand	Middle (47.7%)	Lower (10.0%)	Positive	Negative
Vietnam	Lower (33.8%)	Lower (15.5%)	Positive	Negative

Note: *Urbanization* shows the percentages of population in urban areas (See Table 6). *Level of trust in strangers* indicates the proportion of the percentage of people who answered that the stranger can be trusted (see Table 2). *Trust in strangers and individual well-being* and *Trust in most people and individual well-being* are based on the results of our analysis (see Tables 4 and 5).

of urbanization. This gap should be analyzed in future research.

Indonesia and the Philippines are in the middle stage of development, both in terms of urbanization and trusting strangers. However, we should refrain from a hasty assessment as the proportion of respondents who subjectively stated that they live in urban areas is greater than the objective percentage provided by the United Nations, so deviations from the population were anticipated.

In Thailand and Vietnam, both urbanization and trust in strangers are relatively lower than in other countries. However, the results of the OLS regression paradoxically implied the subjective acceptance of strangers. Under circumstances where contact with strangers is unusual, the presence of strangers, mostly in the form of investors or tourists, is clear for the indigenous people. In this situation, people expect that strangers will bring a direct benefit, even though they would not genuinely trust them. Therefore we predict that these societies will accept strangers physically in the long term.

Furthermore, this framework for assessing the stages of modernization in each society provides a different view than when using trust in most people. As shown in Table 7, trust in most people has a positive impact on individual well-being. Considering the results related to modernization, we have to be satisfied that these societies secure enough diversity at the subjective level of individuals, and are sufficiently developed to be regarded as modern societies. However, if trust in strangers is taken into account, these societies are still developing, as a positive relation between trust in strangers and well-being has not been found. There is a possibility that xenophobia can occur extensively, in spite of or because of urbanized society. Greenen (2002:17–8) argues that the concept of the stranger helps both to explain the causes of modernization and understand anti-modern movements—such as National Socialism—in modern society. Our results support his framework. In contrast to studies on generalized trust that do not sufficiently explain the mechanism of xenophobia in a

modern society, this approach to strangers clarifies both modernization and the anti-modernization movement.

This study also challenges the validity of “generalized” trust. In Thailand and Vietnam it was demonstrated that trust in most people had a negative impact on individual well-being (see Table 7). Shared values or social norms fostered by trust in most people function in ways that are rather oppressive to individuals. This kind of trust in these societies may contain more directly political or nationalistic ideologies, which can be effective for social well-being or collective decision-making, but function to suppress each individual life. As Sen (2006) argues, social capital may generate violence to other groups. If we consider that all values have boundaries and are simultaneously inclusive and exclusive, social scientists should be careful when using the term “general.” Discussions on social capital prefer to regard trust in most people as generalized trust so as to maintain the shared values or collective behavior for a common purpose. Our discussion does not reject the utility of trust in most people, but warns that it has the possibility to generate lack of concern about strangers. Our discussion is not skeptical towards social integration or inclusion. Rather, we can dialectically summarize the relation between trusting most people and strangers. To develop modern and civil society, it is necessary to generate both types of trust at the same time. A society that has higher trust in most people enables its members to have more sympathy for unknown people. However, if society has lower trust in strangers, such individuals are categorized as “marginal,” excluded from and not integrated into society, and thus forgotten.

CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS

As a starting point, this paper qualitatively distinguishes between trust in most people and trust in strangers. Previous studies have addressed the latter as a more valid measure of generalized trust. However, if we

consider the sociology of strangers—which, paradoxically, defines trusting strangers as trusting untrusted others—trust in strangers differs from trust in most people, which promotes cooperative behavior with unknown people based on sympathy or shared values. Trusting strangers itself causes rather than suspends trust with a tolerant attitude.

Given this perspective, we examined the different kinds of trust—namely, trust in family, trust in strangers, and trust in most people—and found that trust in most people is positively correlated with family trust and stranger trust. Trust in most people and trust in family are identical in that they are based on sympathy, while trust in most people is the same as trust in strangers in regard to the trust radius. However, they are different in regard to social consensus and individual well-being. While trusting strangers does not contribute to the creation of social consensus, trusting most people reinforces it. The results of the OLS regressions analyses of seven Asian societies confirm this argument. Moreover, the effect of trust in strangers has no impact on individual well-being, while trust in most people positively affects individual well-being in urbanized society (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan).

The limitations of our research are as follows. This survey, ICSLV, was limited to seven Asian societies, thus we cannot determine whether these results are valid only for Asian societies or also for other regions. Perhaps, in Western societies, not only trusting most people but also trusting strangers may enhance individual and social

well-being.

Another limitation is related to the validity of trust in strangers. It is still unclear what this measure indicates. As we have mentioned, the ambiguity of this measure is plausible according to the theory of strangers, because those who are strangers are highly bounded by the subjectivity of the respondents, cultures, and societies. However, as long as we assign trusting most people to being sympathy-oriented and trusting strangers to being tolerance-oriented, the latter must be correlated to some measure indicating tolerance. In spite of this theoretical perspective, we could not examine the correlation because the ICSLV has no question for properly measuring tolerance.

Lastly, we have to emphasize that the results that showed no direct effect on individual and social well-being did not mean that none of the respondents experienced any kind of well-being from strangers. The interaction effect between them should be examined: some respondents may be happy with strangers even in urbanized societies while others may become unhappy with them. We expect that educated people concerned with sciences, or modern art and culture tend to experience well-being because having a relationship with strangers often generates new information and different values for the dominant group in a society. In any case, the existence of some interaction effect suggests a proper way to accept strangers cognitively, in terms of well-being.

APPENDIX

Table A1. Information about the Variables

		JP	KR	TW	VN	PH	IN	TH
Individual Well-being (0-10)	Mean	5.65	5.54	5.54	7.02	6.67	6.91	7.30
	S.D.	2.03	2.05	1.80	1.57	1.84	1.54	1.69
Problem Solving Ability (1-5)	Mean	2.73	2.90	3.10	3.76	3.53	4.06	3.16
	S.D.	0.73	0.76	1.01	1.03	1.13	0.96	1.06
Female (Dummy)	Mean	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.51	0.50	0.50	0.53
	S.D.	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
Married (Dummy)	Mean	0.62	0.63	0.50	0.67	0.71	0.71	0.61
	S.D.	0.49	0.48	0.50	0.47	0.45	0.45	0.49
Age	Mean	45.61	43.05	40.66	39.67	42.65	38.92	48.53
	S.D.	13.80	12.37	11.70	14.37	14.71	13.17	16.24
Regular Employee	%	40.55	48.30	67.78	12.92	13.07	12.64	16.70
Temporary Employee	%	20.13	10.95	6.38	24.89	18.30	20.48	14.12
Self-employed	%	8.82	17.25	10.59	48.48	31.47	29.60	46.71
Unemployed	%	2.72	5.80	5.17	3.38	9.83	4.08	1.51
Non-employed	%	27.76	17.70	10.07	10.32	27.32	33.20	20.96
Regular Employee	%	40.55	48.30	67.78	12.92	13.07	12.64	16.70
Temporary Employee	%	20.13	10.95	6.38	24.89	18.30	20.48	14.12
Self-employed	%	8.82	17.25	10.59	48.48	31.47	29.60	46.71
Unemployed	%	2.72	5.80	5.17	3.38	9.83	4.08	1.51
Non-employed	%	27.76	17.70	10.07	10.32	27.32	33.20	20.96
University or Higher Degree (Dummy)	Mean	0.53	0.66	0.64	0.23	0.11	0.15	0.23
	S.D.	0.50	0.48	0.48	0.42	0.32	0.35	0.42
Household Income (thousand USD)	Mean	52.62	41.96	30.59	5.17	5.54	4.72	8.11
	S.D.	32.20	22.32	54.17	3.82	6.83	8.07	14.44
Trust in Family (1-5)	Mean	3.78	3.66	3.74	4.42	3.99	4.36	4.47
	S.D.	0.92	0.83	0.81	0.64	0.84	0.57	0.82
Trust in neighbors (1-5)	Mean	2.80	2.79	2.92	3.38	3.20	3.45	3.45
	S.D.	0.79	0.74	0.74	0.80	0.88	0.85	1.00
Trust in governmental stuff (1-5)	Mean	2.69	2.48	2.63	3.44	2.99	2.83	1.98
	S.D.	0.84	0.81	0.84	0.93	0.91	0.99	1.10
Trust in most people (1-5)	Mean	2.71	2.81	3.09	2.68	3.00	3.07	2.40
	S.D.	0.73	0.69	0.71	0.91	0.87	0.87	1.10
Trust in strangers (1-5)	Mean	2.10	1.91	2.29	1.68	1.97	1.92	1.34
	S.D.	0.86	0.77	0.77	0.82	0.89	0.85	0.75

Note: Household income of each society was converted to thousand US dollars. The exchange rates were adopted from the average rate of the surveyed year, based on World Bank data (<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/pa.nus.fcrf>) and the Fed (<https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/hist/>).

Table A2. Spearman's Partial Correlation between the Kinds of Trust

JP (N=11,804)		Trust in				
		Most People	Strangers	Family	Neighbors	Government staff
Trust in	Most People	1.00				
	Strangers	0.35 ***	1.00			
	Family	0.09 ***	-0.17 ***	1.00		
	Neighbors	0.35 ***	0.21 ***	0.25 ***	1.00	
	Government staff	0.16 ***	0.26 ***	0.14 ***	0.17 ***	1.00
KR (N=2,000)		Trust in				
		Most People	Strangers	Family	Neighbors	Government staff
Trust in	Most People	1.00				
	Strangers	0.28 ***	1.00			
	Family	0.18 ***	-0.12 ***	1.00		
	Neighbors	0.30 ***	0.33 ***	0.25 ***	1.00	
	Government staff	0.16 ***	0.24 ***	0.10 ***	0.07 **	1.00
TW (N=2,303)		Trust in				
		Most People	Strangers	Family	Neighbors	Government staff
Trust in	Most People	1.00				
	Strangers	0.23 ***	1.00			
	Family	0.33 ***	-0.12 ***	1.00		
	Neighbors	0.24 ***	0.29 ***	0.23 ***	1.00	
	Government staff	0.14 ***	0.24 ***	0.07 ***	0.14 ***	1.00
VN (N=1,191)		Trust in				
		Most People	Strangers	Family	Neighbors	Government staff
Trust in	Most People	1.00				
	Strangers	0.30 ***	1.00			
	Family	0.17 ***	-0.21 ***	1.00		
	Neighbors	0.15 ***	0.15 ***	0.16 ***	1.00	
	Government staff	0.14 ***	0.10 ***	0.06 *	0.07 **	1.00
PH (N=1,131)		Trust in				
		Most People	Strangers	Family	Neighbors	Government staff
Trust in	Most People	1.00				
	Strangers	0.20 ***	1.00			
	Family	0.20 ***	-0.04	1.00		
	Neighbors	0.22 ***	0.09 **	0.23 ***	1.00	
	Government staff	0.11 ***	0.05	0.18 ***	0.18 ***	1.00
IN (N=1,134)		Trust in				
		Most People	Strangers	Family	Neighbors	Government staff
Trust in	Most People	1.00				
	Strangers	0.21 ***	1.00			
	Family	0.06 *	-0.07 *	1.00		
	Neighbors	0.27 ***	0.16 ***	0.37 ***	1.00	
	Government staff	0.14 ***	0.15 ***	0.00	0.15 ***	1.00
TH (N=1,112)		Trust in				
		Most People	Strangers	Family	Neighbors	Government staff
Trust in	Most People	1.00				
	Strangers	0.18 ***	1.00			
	Family	-0.08 **	-0.08 *	1.00		
	Neighbors	0.22 ***	0.08 **	0.36 ***	1.00	
	Government staff	0.17 ***	0.30 ***	-0.04	0.15 ***	1.00

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the MEXT-Supported Program for the Strategic Research Foundation at Private Universities of Japan, 2014-2018 (S1491003). "International Comparative Surveys on Lifestyle and Values" were designed and conducted by the Center for Social Well-being Studies, Institute for the Development of Social Intelligence, Senshu University, Japan, in collaboration with the Social Well-being Research Consortium in Asia.

References

- Banton, Michael. 2008. "The Sociology of Ethnic Relations." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 31(7):1267–85.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. 1998. "Moderne und Ambivalenz" (Modernity and Ambivalence). Pp. 23–49 in *Das Eigene und das Fremde: Neuer Rassismus in der Alten Welt?*, edited by Ulrich Bielefeld. Hamburg, Germany: Hamburger ED.
- Bauman, Zygmunt, and Tim May. 2001. *Thinking Sociologically*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Büschges, Günter. 1997. "Selbstliebe, Glück, Solidarität: the Pursuit of Happiness bei den Schottischen Moralphilosophen," (Self-love, Happiness, Solidarity: the Pursuit of Happiness by Scottish Moral Philosophers). Pp. 19–35 in *Glücksvorstellungen: ein Rückgriff in die Geschichte der Soziologie*, edited by Alfred Bellebaum and Klaus Barheier. Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Dinesen, Peter Thisted, and Kim Mannemar Sønderskov. 2015. "Ethnic Diversity and Social Trust." *American Sociological Review* 80(3):550–73. doi: 10.1177/0003122415577989.
- Delhey, Jan, Kenneth Newton, and Christian Welzel. 2011. "How General Is Trust in 'Most People'? Solving the Radius of Trust Problem." *American Sociological Review* 76(5):786–807.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1990. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Goffman, Erving. 1963. *Behavior in Public Places: Notes on the Social Organization of Gatherings*. New York: Free Press.
- Greenen, Elke M. 2002. *Soziologie des Fremden: ein gesellschaftstheoretischer Entwurf (Sociology of Strangers: A Social-theoretical Sketch)*. Opladen, Germany: Springer.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. New York: Free Press.
- Hahn, Alois, 1994, "Die soziale Konstruktion des Fremden," (The Social Construction of Strangers). Pp.140–63 in *Die Objektivität der Ordnung und ihre kommunikative Konstruktion. Für Thomas Luckmann*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
- Helliwell, John F. 2002 "How's Life? Combining Individual and National Variables to Explain Subjective Well-being." *Economic Modelling* 20(2): 331–60.
- Helliwell, John F., Haifang Huang, and Shun Wang. 2016. "The Distribution of World Happiness." Pp. 8-49 in *World Happiness Report 2016, Update (Vol. I)*, edited by John Helliwell, Richard Layard, and Jeffrey Sachs. New York: Sustainable Development Solutions Network.
- Hellmann, Kai-Uwe. 1998. "Fremdheit als soziale Konstruktion: eine Studie zur Systemtheorie des Fremden," (Strangeness as Social Construction: A Study for System Theory of Strangers). Pp. 401–59 in *Die Herausforderung durch das Fremde*, edited by Herfried Münkler. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
- Longhi, Simonetta. 2014. "Cultural Diversity and Subjective Well-Being." *IZA Journal of Migration* 3(13). doi: 10.1186/2193-9039-3-13.
- Luhmann, Niklas. [1968] 1973, *Vertrauen, ein Mechanismus der Reduktion sozialer Komplexität (Trust and Power)*. Stuttgart, Germany: Ferdinand Enke Verlag.
- Naef, Michael, and Jürgen Schupp. 2009. "Measuring Trust: Experiments and Surveys in Contrast and Combination." *Discussion Paper No. 4087*. Bonn: the Institute for the Study of Labor.
- Nassehi, Armin, 1995, "Der Fremde als Vertrauter: Soziologische Beobachtungen zur Konstruktion von Identitäten und Differenzen," (Stranger as Trusted: Sociological Views on the Construction of Identities and Differences). *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 47:443–63.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Putnam, Robert D. 2001. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Putnam, Robert D. 2007. "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century: The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30(2):137–74.
- Radtke, Frank-Olaf. 1998. "Lob der Gleich-Gültigkeit: die Konstruktion des Fremden in Diskurs des Multikulturalismus," (Praise of Indifference: The Construction of Strangeness in Discourse of Multiculturalism). Pp. 79–96 in *Das Eigene und das Fremde: Neuer Rassismus in der Alten Welt?*, edited by Ulrich Bielefeld. Hamburg, Germany: Hamburger ED.
- Ribison, Lindon J., A. Allan Schmid, and Marcelo E. Silés. 2002. "Is Social Capital Really Capital?" *Review of Social Economy* 60(1):1–21.
- Rose, David C. 2014. *The Moral Foundation of Economic Behavior*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schütz, Alfred. 2002 [1944]. "Der Fremde. Ein sozialpsychologischer Versuch," (The Stranger: A Social Psychological Approach). Pp. 73–92 in *Der Fremde als sozialer Typus*, edited by Gerhard Wagner and Peter U Merz-Benz. Konstanz, Germany: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft.
- Sen, Amartya. 2006. *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*. London: Penguin Books.
- Simmel, Georg. 1903. "Die Lehre Kants von Pflicht und Glück," (Kant's Teaching on Duty and Happiness). *Das freie Wort: Frankfurter Halbmonatsschrift für Fortschritt auf allen Gebieten des geistigen Lebens* 3(14):548–53.
- Simmel, Georg. 1908. "Exkurs über den Fremden," (Excursus on the Strangers). Pp. 509–12 in *Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung*. Berlin, Germany: Duncker & Humblot.
- Sombart, Werner. 1991 [1928]. *Der moderne Kapitalismus*. [Reprint]. *Historisch-systematische Darstellung des gesamteuropäischen Wirtschaftslebens von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (Modern Capitalism: Historical and Systematic Presentation of the Overall European Economic Life from its Beginnings to the Present Day)*. München,

- Germany: DTV Deutscher Taschenbuch.
- Stichweh, Rudolf. 2007. *Fremdheit in der Weltgesellschaft: Indifferenz und Minimalsympathie (Strangeness in the World Society: Indifference and Minimal Sympathy)*. Retrieved May 30, 2018 (https://www.fiw.uni-bonn.de/demokratieforschung/personen/stichweh/pdfs/28_25stwfremdheitinderweltgesellschaft.pdf).
- Stichweh, Rudolf. 2010. *Der Fremde: Studien zu Soziologie und Sozialgeschichte (The Stranger: Studies for Sociology and Social History)*. Berlin, Germany: Suhrkamp.
- Sturgis, Patrick, and Patten Smith. 2010. "Assessing the Validity of Generalized Trust Questions: What Kind of Trust Are We Measuring?" *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 22(1):74–92.
- Stolle, Dietlind. 2002. "Trusting Strangers: The Concept of Generalized Trust in Perspective." *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 31(4):397–412.
- Tönnies, Ferdinand. 2005 [1887]. *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie (Community and Society: Basic Concepts in Pure Sociology)*. Darmstadt, Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Uslaner, Eric M. 2002. *The Moral Foundations of Trust*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2014. *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision*.
- Keitaro Yazaki** is Lecturer in Sociology at Senshu University. His research focuses on social system theory, sociology of art, well-being, and quantitative methods. He is a member of the Center for Social Well-being Studies at Senshu University.